In the traditional identity-based cryptography, when a user holds multiple identities as its public keys, it has to manage an equal number of private keys. The recent advances of identity-based cryptography allow a single private key to map multiple public keys (identities) that are selectable by the user. This approach simplifies the private key management. Unfortunately, the existing schemes have a heavy computation overhead, since the private key generator has to authenticate all identities in order to generate a resultant private key. In particular, it has been considered as a drawback that the data size for a user is proportional to the number of associated identities. Moreover, these schemes do not allow dynamic changes of user identities. When a user upgrades its identities, the private key generator (PKG) has to authenticate the identities and generate a new private key. To overcome these problems, in this paper we present an efficient dynamic identitybased key exchange protocol with selectable identities, and prove its security under the bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model.
Introduction
The concept of identity-based cryptography was introduced by Shamir in 1984 [1] . The idea is to allow a user identity to serve as a public key. The corresponding private key is created by binding the identity string with a master secret of a trusted authority called the private key generator (PKG). Due to its advantage in key management in comparison to the traditional PKI-based cryptography, identity-based cryptography has received a lot of attention. The introduction of pairings to cryptography [2, 3] opened up an entirely new field for identity-based cryptography. Many novel identity-based key agreement protocols from pairings have been introduced and proved in different security models (e.g., [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] ).
In an identity-based system, a private key is created by binding an identity string and the master key of PKG. An obvious key management issue arises, when a user holds multiple identities, as multiple identities lead to multiple private keys. Moreover, using multiple private keys and public keys in key agreement could result in high computational complexity.
To simplify private key management for a user with multiple identities, we seek a solution where multiple identities are associated with a single private key. Recently, Guo et al. [10, 11] introduced an encryption scheme that captures the features of multiple identities. However the security proof in [10] is pointed out to be incorrect [12] . Furthermore, [12] presented a new authenticated key agreement protocol with selectable identities. To prove the security of their scheme in the random oracle model, they also introduced a new assumption called the k-multiple bilinear collision attack assumption (k-MBCAA1).
Unfortunately, the Guo et al. scheme [12] is inefficient in terms of the computation cost. Suppose that user A has m identities and B has n identities and that A chooses k identities as B's public key. During a key agreement process, A has to generate n data items for exchange and carry out (k + 1)n scalar multiplications and kn addition operations in ellipse curves. Furthermore, in their scheme, the PKG has to authenticate all identities and generate a resultant private key for a user. This would be a burden to the PKG for a large group of users. We also notice that their scheme is not dynamic. When a new identity is added or an old identity is canceled, the corresponding private key will become invalid and a new private key needs to be issued by the PKG. This implies that the PKG has to re-authenticate the identities that it has authenticated before, as these data are not recorded. In a dynamic environment where users change some of their identities from time to time, their scheme is not practical because PKG needs to be ''online'', which is not desirable for the PKG.
We observed that identities for a user can be classed as permanent and temporary in the real world. For example, the birthday and the identity card number are permanent identities, while the mobile phone number and the student card number might be temporary identities. When user A wants to establish a session key with user B, he could just select a permanent identity and several temporary identities, instead of all identities, from B's identity set as B's public key. For example, when A wants to purchase something from an online shop, she only needs to choose B's (as a seller) identity card number, and mobile phone number as B's public keys. The staff from the Traffic Management Bureau could choose just B's identity card number, driver's license number, email address and other related identities as B's public key.
In this paper, we present an efficient dynamic identity-based key agreement protocol with selectable identities. The key idea is that we use a private key corresponding to a permanent identity as the user's private key. Using this private key, a user with multiple identities can establish a shared session key with another user. As a result, our scheme has the following features:
• The PKG avoids authenticating all of the identities when generating a private key for a user. It only needs to authenticate one identity and generate a private key for the user corresponding to this identity at the beginning of the setup stage. After that, PKG can be ''offline'' as in other identity-based schemes.
• Our scheme achieves the dynamic property. A user can add, delete, or update temporary identities at will, which will not affect its private key.
• Our scheme is efficient in terms of the computation cost. In our scheme, A only needs to generate k messages (k ≤ n, where by n we denote the number of identities that a user holds), and needs to do k scalar multiplications and k addition operations. The computation cost is only related to k, which is generally small in the real world.
• The security of our scheme can be reduced to the bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption, which is a standard assumption and is weaker than the ''k-multiple bilinear collision attack assumption (k-MBCAA1)'' used in the proof of the scheme in [12] .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the preliminaries including bilinear pairing, security assumption and the security model. In Section 3, we present a multi-identity key agreement protocol. In Section 4, we prove the security of the multi-identity key agreement protocol. In Section 5, we conclude the paper.
Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the background knowledge that will be used for our scheme. We give the basic definition and properties of bilinear pairings, the computational problems and the security model.
The bilinear map and security assumption
We first revisit the basic definition of bilinear map and the bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem. The details can be found in [3] .
The bilinear mapê is defined over two groups of the same prime order q denoted by G and G T in which the computational Diffie-Hellman problem is hard. More formally, we have the following definition: Definition 1 (Bilinear Map). Let G be an additive group of prime order q and G T a multiplicative group of the same order.
Let P denote a generator of G. An admissible pairing is a bilinear mapê : G × G → G T which has the following properties:
• Bilinear: given Q , R ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z * q , we haveê(aQ , bR) =ê(Q , R) ab . • Non-degenerate:ê(P, P) ̸ = 1 G T . • Computable:ê is efficiently computable.
Typically, the mapê can be derived from either the Weil pairing or Tate pairing on an elliptic curve over a finite field. More details on how these groups, pairings and other parameters should be selected in practice for efficiency and security can be found in [3, 13, 14] .
Computational problems
The bilinear map captures an important cryptographic problem, i.e., the bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem, which was introduced by Boneh and Franklin [3] . Definition 2 (BDH). Let G and G T be two groups of a prime order q ≥ 2 k , where k is security parameter. Let P ∈ G * be a generator of G. Suppose that there exists a bilinear mapê : G × G → G T . Let A BDH be an attacker modeled as a probabilistic Turing machine taking the security parameter k as input. Suppose that a, b and c are uniformly chosen at random from Z * q and aP, bP and cP are computed. A BDH is to solve the following problem:
Given (G, G T , q,ê, P, aP, bP, cP), computeê(P, P) abc .
We define A BDH 's success probability as
We denote by Succ BDH G (t BDH ) the maximal success probability Succ BDH G,A BDH (k) over all attackers having running time bounded by t BDH which is polynomial in the security parameter k.
The BDH problem is said to be computationally intractable if Succ BDH
Security models
In this paper, we shall adopt a modified security model proposed by Bellare and Rogaway [15] to analyze the security of our multi-identity key exchange protocol. The model includes a set of parties and each party involved in a session is modeled by an oracle. An oracle Π s i,j denotes an instance of a party i involved with a partner party j in a session s where the instance of the party j is Π t j,i for some t. These parties cannot communicate directly; instead they only communicate with each other via an adversary. An adversary can access the oracle by issuing some specified queries as follows.
Send The security of a protocol is defined using the two-phase game G played between a malicious adversary A and a collection of oracles. At the first stage, A is able to send the above first three oracle queries at will. Then, at some point, A will choose a fresh session Π s i,j on which to be tested and send a Test query to the fresh oracle associated with the test session. After this point, the adversary can continue querying the oracles but cannot reveal the test oracle or its partner, and cannot corrupt the entity j. Eventually, A terminates the game simulation and outputs a bit b ′ for b. We say that A wins if the adversary guesses the correct b.
Define the advantage of A as
where k is a security parameter. The fresh oracle in the game is defined as follows.
Definition 4 (Fresh Oracle [16] ). An oracle Π s i,j is called fresh if (1) Π s i,j has accepted; (2) Π s i,j is unopened; (3) j ̸ = i is not corrupted; (4) there is no opened oracle Π t j,i , which has had a matching conversation to Π s i,j . In this work, we use the concatenation of the messages in a session to define the session ID, and thus to define the matching conversation, i.e., two oracles Π s i,j and Π t j,i have a matching conversation with each other if both of them have the same session ID.
A secure authenticated key agreement protocol is defined as follows.
Definition 5. Protocol Π is a secure authenticated key agreement protocol, if:
• In the presence of the benign adversary (who faithfully relays messages between parties), for Π s i,j and Π t j,i , both oracles always accept holding the same session key and this key is distributed uniformly at random on session key space.
• For every probability polynomial time (PPT) adversary A, Adv A (k) is negligible.
As mentioned in [9] , if a protocol is proved to be secure with respect to the above definition, then it achieves implicit mutual key authentication and the basic security properties, i.e., known session key security, key-compromise impersonation resilience and unknown key-share resilience.
A multi-identity key agreement protocol
In this section, we present a multi-identity key exchange protocol. Suppose two parties A and B want to establish a shared session key using this protocol. A holds m IDs (ID A,1 , ID A,2 , . . . , ID A,m ) and B holds n IDs (ID B,1 , ID B,2 , . . . , ID B,n ).
The scheme
Our scheme consists of three algorithms: Setup, Extract and Key Agreement.
• Setup:
-On input of a security parameter k, the PKG generates a prime q, two groups G, G T of order q and a bilinear pairinĝ
Then, PKG sets P pub,1 = sP and P pub,2 = sQ to be the public keys of PKG. s is set as the master key.
-PKG publishes system parameters
and keeps master key s secret.
• Extract: Suppose a user A has a permanent identity, written as ID A,1 . When A requires the corresponding private key from PKG, PKG takes as input params, master key s and the identity ID A,1 ∈ {0, 1} * , generates the private key d A = sH 1 (ID A,1 )
and sends it to user A by a private authenticated channel.
• Key Agreement: Suppose that user A is an initiator and B is an intended partner.
. . , m}) as A's public key. Note that ID A,1 and ID B,1 must be involved in their public keys. A and B have the private key as d A = sH 1 (ID A,1 ) and d B = sH 1 (ID B,1 ) corresponding to the identities ID A,1 and ID B,1 , respectively. Let
To establish a shared session secret key, A and B conduct the following tasks:
-A chooses a random number r 1 ∈ Z * q . Then A computes r 1 P and
-B chooses a random number r 2 ∈ Z * q . Then B computes r 2 P and r 2 (Q + Q A,i ) (i = 2, . . . , k). B sends T B = (r 2 P, r 2 (Q + Q A,i )) to A.
-After receiving message T B , A conducts the following tasks:
* Define a (k + 1) × (k + 1) matrix A k as follows:
In the matrix, α 0 = (0, 1, . . . , 0, 0, 0, . . . , 0) with k + 1 elements. In α i (1 ≤ i ≤ k), only the first element and the ith element are 1. Other elements are set to 0.
Let (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k+1 ) be the solution of the following equation:
. * Compute the session secrets as
• After receiving message T A , B conducts similar tasks and obtains the session secrets as
Correctness
Now we verify the correctness of the protocol. Take user A as an example. Since
Finally, A computes its first session secret as
Similarly, B can compute its first session secret as
Thus, the two secret keys computed by A and B are equal, i.e., A and B have successfully established the shared key K 1 = K AB,1 = K BA,1 and K 2 = K AB,2 = K BA,2 after running an instance of the protocol. The final shared session key is then 
Proof. Firstly, we define Session ID as a concatenation of T A ‖ T B . We focus on how to construct an algorithm B using the adversary A to solve a BDH problem with non-negligible probability.
Given an instance of the BDH problem ⟨q, k, G, G T ,ê, P, aP, bP, cP⟩ whereê is a bilinear pairingê : G × G → G T , B's task is computingê(P, P) abc .
Setup: B simulates the Setup algorithm as follows:
B chooses a random value y ∈ Z * q and computes Q = yP. Then B sets P pub,1 = aP and computes P pub,2 = aQ = ayP = yaP where a is the master key which is unknown to the simulator. After that, B chooses two hash functions H 1 and H 2 , and sends the system parameters ⟨q, G, G T ,ê, P, Q , P pub,1 , P pub,2 , H 1 , H 2 ⟩ to A. The hash functions H 1 and H 2 are random oracles controlled by B.
Algorithm B randomly chooses I ∈ R {1, . . . , q 1 } and J ∈ R {1, . . . , q 0 } and begins its simulation. Here we should note that the notation ID i,u means the uth chosen identity of user i, and Π s i,j is the sth oracle among all the created oracles. Also note that n t i,j means the number of the identities that i chooses from j's identities set in this session. Algorithm B answers the queries which are asked by adversary A in arbitrary order as follows. If ID i,u already appears on H list
If ID i,u is the Ith unique query to H 1 where (i, u) = (I, 1), then B stores (i, ID i,u , bP, ⊥) into the tuple list and responds with H 1 (ID i,u ) = bP.
If ID i,u is the query to H 1 where (i, u) = (i, 1), then B randomly selects l i,1 and computes H 1 (ID i,1 ) = h i,u = l i,1 P and
Otherwise, B checks the tuple indexed by (i,
. B responds to the query in the following way.
and proceeds as follows.
-Test whetherê(m 
Note that Π t i,j is put on the list L in the Reveal query only when Π t i,j has been revealed and d i = abP, but
had not been queried before the Reveal query. So, SK t i,j has been randomly sampled.
into the list and returns ζ t .
Corrupt(i) queries: When receiving this query, B goes through list H list 1 . If i is not on the list, B queries H 1 (ID i,1 ) . B checks the value of d i . If d i =⊥, then B aborts the game (Event 1). Otherwise, B sends d i to A.
Send(Π t i,j , (m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n s j,i )) queries: B maintains a list Ω for each oracle of the form (Π t i,j , tran t i,j , r t i,j , K t ij,1 , K t ij,2 , SK t i,j ).
tran t i,j is the transcript of the oracle so far; r t i,j is the random integer used by the oracle to generate the messages; K t ij,1 , K t ij,2
and SK t i,j are set as ⊥ initially. This list is updated in other queries as well. B proceeds in the following way:
B looks through the list H list B checks t. If t = J, B checks the value of d j and gives different responses depending on it, as below.
• If d j ̸ =⊥, B aborts the game (Event 2).
• Otherwise, compute c(yP + l j,u P) = (y + l j,u )cP where u ∈ {2, . . . , n t i,j } and l j,u can be found from H list 1 . Respond with them along with cP and set r t i,j = ⊥. If t ̸ = J, B proceeds with the protocol as follows.
• If d i ̸ = ⊥, randomly sample r t i,j ∈ Z * q and respond with r t i,j P, r t
Reveal(Π t i,j ) queries: B maintains a list L with tuples of the form (ID i , ID j , T i , T j , Π t i,j ). B answers the queries as follows: • Get the tuple of oracle Π t i,j from Ω. • If oracle Π t i,j has not accepted, respond with ⊥. • If t = J or if the Jth oracle has been generated as Π J a,b and ID a = ID j , ID b = ID i and two oracles have the same session ID, abort the game (Event 3).
. . , m n s j,i }) are the received messages on tran t i,j . By making an H 2 query, set SK t 
otherwise, meeting the equationê(f t i,j aP, m 1 ) =ê(P, Z u ). If such a Z u is found, then compute
i,j (yP +l j,1 P), . . . , r t i,j (yP +l j,n t i,j P)) and T t j = (m 1 , . . . ,
into list L. * B returns SK t i,j as the response and updates Ω by putting SK t i,j . Test(Π t i,j ) query: If t ̸ = J or (t = J but) there is an oracle Π s j,i which has the same session ID as Π t i,j that has been revealed, B aborts the game (Event 4). Otherwise, B responds to A with a random number ζ ∈ {0, 1} n .
After A finishes the queries, it returns its guess. Then B proceeds with the following steps:
where m 1 is the first incoming message and M t i,j can be computed from the rest of the incoming messages. Also note that d i = l i,1 aP where l i,1 ̸ = ⊥ and can be found from H list 1 corresponding to identifier ID i . Note that Proof. B gives the satisfying response to most of the oracles by following the protocol specification honestly, except for the one Π t i,j whose private key is abP and H(ID i,1 ) = bP and where the incoming messages (m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n s j,i ) are from the tested oracle where m 1 = cP. Note that the transcripts are one part of the input to H 2 which is modeled as the random oracle in order to compute the session key. If there is some difference between the Reveal query on Π t 3. Event 3, denoted as F 3 : A revealed the Jth oracle or its partner oracle, which goes against the definition of the fresh oracle.
Event 4, denoted as F 4 :
A did not choose the Jth oracle as the challenge fresh oracle or the partner of the fresh oracle has been revealed, which made it such that the Test query cannot work.
According to the rules of the game, we have 
which contradicts the hardness of the BDH problem. This completes the security analysis of the protocol.
Conclusion
We proposed a novel selectable identity authenticated key agreement protocol to optimize public key/private key management for a user with multiple identities. We proved our scheme in the random oracle model and for the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. Our protocol demonstrated an obvious advantage in comparison with other schemes. Our protocol is highly efficient in terms of computation cost and storage cost. Moreover, our scheme is dynamic, since it allows a user to add, delete, or update its temporary identities. These features are important especially for some special networks, such as mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) and tactical networks which are very dynamic and have significant bandwidth and power constraints.
